Overall, the deregulation of genetically engineered (GE) crops for commercial cultivation in North America has been a success story. In several cases, however, GE crops have sparked concerns and disagreements among the stakeholders and there are incidences of court lawsuits, including a recent one on glyphosate resistant (GR) alfalfa (Medicago sativa, L.). While GE crops can provide operational benefits to farmers, challenges are looming from commercialization of perennial GE crops. The unique ecology and biology of these crops and GE alfalfa (...) in particular can facilitate adventitious presence (AP) of GE traits and it makes more visible that economic risks for conventional growers and food/feed producers have not been adequately addressed by the GE regulatory system in the United States (US). Asynchronous market approvals and the existence of a number of GE sensitive export markets create uncertainties among the exporters. Policy development in these fields may be helpful for ensuring a broader acceptance and market success of GE agriculture in general. The analysis is focusing on the US, although many diagnosed problems are also relevant to other jurisdictions—in particular if no co-existence policy is in place. (shrink)

Adaptive phenotypic plasticity allows organisms to cope with environmental variability, and yet, despite its adaptive significance, phenotypic plasticity is neither ubiquitous nor infinite. In this review, we merge developmental and population genetic perspectives to explore costs and limits on the evolution of plasticity. Specifically, we focus on the role of modularity in developmental genetic networks as a mechanism underlying phenotypic plasticity, and apply to it lessons learned from population genetic theory on the interplay between relaxed selection and mutation accumulation. We (...) argue that the environmental specificity of gene expression and the associated reduction in pleiotropic constraints drive a fundamental tradeoff between the range of plasticity that can be accommodated and mutation accumulation in alternative developmental networks. This tradeoff has broad implications for understanding the origin and maintenance of plasticity and may contribute to a better understanding of the role of plasticity in the origin, diversification, and loss of phenotypic diversity. (shrink)

Problem: Visions of technology, future scenarios, guiding visions represent imaginations of future states of affairs that play a functional role in processes of technological research, development and innovation—e.g. as a means to create attention, communication, coordination, or for the strategic exertion of influence. Since a couple of years there is a growing attention for such imaginations of futures in politics, the economy, research and the civil society. This trend concerns technology assessment as an observer of these processes and a consultant (...) on the implications of technology and innovation. TA faces increasing demands to assess imaginations of futures that circulate in the present and to participate in shaping these through scenarios or foresights. More than ever, this raises the question, which propositions can be made based on these imaginations by TA and how this can be used in advisory practices. Imaginations of futures are relevant for TA not as predictions but in their significance and effectiveness in the present, which need to be understood and assessed.Contents: This discussion paper outlines how present significance and effects of imagined futures in technological research and innovation processes can be conceived and analyzed. In this paper, all forms of imaginations of technology futures will be called “socio-technical futures” because within them technological developments and social changes are interwoven and inseparably interrelated. In this paper, we discuss why TA should analyze socio-technical futures, how such analyses can grasp the societal conditions that are expressed in the imagined futures and how these become effective in processes of technology development, communication, decision making etc. We raise the question which self-reflexive positioning or possible realignment of TA is needed as a response to its increased concern with assessing and even co-producing socio-technical futures. The latter is often demanded regarding the growing attention by politics and publics to imaginations of futures with wide temporal and spatial reach.Addressee of this paper is the TA community in a broader sense. The aim is to sensitize colleagues for the topic and its challenges, to consolidate discussions and to provide theoretical and methodical suggestions for research in TA and related advisory practices with respect to socio-technical futures. This paper has been originally initiated during the workshop “The present of technological futures-theoretical and methodical challenges for Technology Assessment”, in which all of the paper’s authors participated. The contents of this discussion paper are preliminary results that shall initiate and guide further discussions. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de présenter et d’évaluer la théorie de la fondation de Bernard Bolzano, c’est-à-dire sa théorie du concept exprimé et de la relation mise en jeu par « parce que ». Dans la première partie , le concept de fondation est distingué et mis en relation avec trois autres concepts : le concept de raison épistémique, le concept de causalité et le concept de déductibilité . Dans la seconde partie , je reconstruis la théorie bolzanienne (...) de la fondation sous forme axiomatique et j’en offre une discussion critique.The aim of the paper is to present and evaluate Bernard Bolzano’s theory of grounding, i.e. his theory of the concept expressed and the relation brought into play by ‘because’. In the first part the concept of grounding is distinguished from and related to three other concepts : the concept of an epistemic reason, the concept of causality and the concept of deducibility . In its second part Bolzano’s positive account of grounding is reconstructed in axiomatic form and critically discussed. (shrink)

Three facts are widely thought to be key to the characterization of human cognitive uniqueness (though a number of other factors are often cited as well): (a) humans are sophisticated cultural learners; (b) humans often rely on mental states with rich representational contents; and (c) humans have the ability and disposition to make and use tools. This article argues that (a)–(c) create a positive feedback loop: Sophisticated cultural learning makes possible the manufacture of tools that increase the sophistication of representational (...) decision-making, which in turn allows for yet further increases in the sophistication of cultural learning and tool manufacture. (shrink)

A key component of much current research in behavioral ecology, cognitive science, and economics is a model of the mind at least partly based on beliefs and desires. However, despite this prevalence, there are still many open questions concerning both the structure and the applicability of this model. This is especially so when it comes to its ‘desire’ part: in particular, it is not yet entirely clear when and why we should expect organisms to be desire-based—understood so as to imply (...) that they consult explicit tokenings of what they ought to do—as opposed to being drive-based—understood so as to imply that they react to the world using behavioral reflexes. In this paper, I present the beginnings of an answer to this question. To do this, I start by showing that an influential recent attempt to address these issues—due to Kim Sterelny—fails to be fully successful, as it does not make sufficiently clear what the relative benefits and disadvantages of drive-based and desire-based cognitive architectures are. I then present an alternative account of this matter based on the idea that organisms that can follow explicit behavioral rules (i.e. which have desires) avoid having to memorize a large set of state of the world–action connections—which can (though need not) be adaptive. Finally, I apply this account to the question of what the cognitive value of mental representations should be seen to be; here, I conclude that—contrary to some recent claims—relying on mental representations can make decision making easier, not harder, but also that—in line with these recent claims—whether it does so depends on the details of the case. (shrink)

A key component of much current research in behavioral ecology, cognitive science, and economics is a model of the mind at least partly based on beliefs and desires. However, despite this prevalence, there are still many open questions concerning both the structure and the applicability of this model. This is especially so when it comes to its ‘desire’ part: in particular, it is not yet entirely clear when and why we should expect organisms to be desire-based—understood so as to imply (...) that they consult explicit tokenings of what they ought to do—as opposed to being drive-based—understood so as to imply that they react to the world using behavioral reflexes. In this paper, I present the beginnings of an answer to this question. To do this, I start by showing that an influential recent attempt to address these issues—due to Kim Sterelny—fails to be fully successful, as it does not make sufficiently clear what the relative benefits and disadvantages of drive-based and desire-based cognitive architectures are. I then present an alternative account of this matter based on the idea that organisms that can follow explicit behavioral rules avoid having to memorize a large set of state of the world–action connections—which can be adaptive. Finally, I apply this account to the question of what the cognitive value of mental representations should be seen to be; here, I conclude that—contrary to some recent claims—relying on mental representations can make decision making easier, not harder, but also that—in line with these recent claims—whether it does so depends on the details of the case. (shrink)

Although it is clear that many of the major contemporary social problems center on the extent to which social institutions do or do not function as they are meant to do, it is still unclear exactly what the function of a social institution is—and thus when this function is undermined. This paper presents and defends a novel theory of social functionalism—presentist social functionalism—to answer these questions. According to this theory, the function of social institutions is grounded in those of their (...) features that, in the current cultural environment, increase their chances to survive or reproduce. To bring out the fruitfulness of this account, the paper analyzes the (still controversial) question of the function of corporations, and shows that present social functionalism (a) points to the kinds of data that would be helpful to determine this function, (b) brings up hitherto overlooked theoretical possibilities, and (c) allows for the clearer assessment and handling of corporate corruption. (shrink)

David Buss’s Sexual Strategies Theory is one of the major evolutionary psychological research programmes, but, as I try to show in this paper, its theoretical and empirical foundations cannot yet be seen to be fully compelling. This lack of cogency comes about due to Buss’s failure to attend to the interactive nature of his subject matter, which leads him to overlook two classic and well known issues of game theoretic and evolutionary biological analysis. Firstly, Buss pays insufficient attention to the (...) fact that, since mate choice is a cooperative decision, what is adaptive for the two sexes individually is irrelevant to the evolutionary explanation of our sexual strategies; instead, all that matters is what is adaptive given the choices made by the other sex. Secondly, Buss does not pay enough attention to the difference between polymorphic and monomorphic evolutionarily stable states in his attempt to empirically confirm his theory. Because of this, the data he presents and analyses are unable to show that natural selection is the most important element in the explanation of the origins of our sexual strategies. In this way, I try to make clear that, at least as things stand now, Buss has failed to provide compelling grounds for thinking that Sexual Strategies Theory can make a major contribution to human psychology. (shrink)

I develop a distinction between two types of psychological hedonism. Inferential hedonism (or “I-hedonism”) holds that each person only has ultimate desires regarding his or her own hedonic states (pleasure and pain). Reinforcement hedonism (or “R–hedonism”) holds that each person's ultimate desires, whatever their contents are, are differentially reinforced in that person’s cognitive system only by virtue of their association with hedonic states. I’ll argue that accepting R-hedonism and rejecting I-hedonism provides a conciliatory position on the traditional altruism debate, and (...) that it coheres well with the neuroscientist Anthony Dickinson’s theory about the evolutionary function of hedonic states, the “hedonic interface theory.” Finally, I’ll defend R-hedonism from potential objections. (shrink)

Schon seit ihrer Gründung in den 1970er-Jahren ist die Reihe Germanistische Linguistik (RGL) exponiertes Forum des Faches, dessen Namen sie im Titel führt. Hinsichtlich der thematischen Breite (Sprachebenen, Varietäten, Kommunikationsformen, Epochen), der Forschungsperspektiven (Theorie und Empirie, Grundlagenforschung und Anwendung, Inter- und Transdisziplinarität) und des methodologischen Spektrums ist die Reihe offen angelegt. Das Aufgreifen neuer Trends hat in ihr ebenso Platz wie das Fortführen von Bewährtem. Die Publikationsformen reichen von Monographien und Sammelbänden bis zu Wörterbüchern. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (ab November 2011): Prof. (...) Dr. Karin Donhauser (Berlin) Prof. Dr. Stephan Elspaß (Augsburg) Prof. Dr. Helmuth Feilke (Gießen) Prof. Dr. Jürg Fleischer (Marburg) Prof. Dr. Stephan Habscheid (Siegen) Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Harnisch (Passau). (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present and evaluate Bolzano's theory of grounding, that is, his theory of the concept expressed and the relation brought into play by 'because'. In the first part of the paper (Sections 1-4) the concept of grounding is distinguished from and related to three other concepts: the concept of an epistemic reason}, the concept of causality, and the concept of deducibility (i.e., logical consequence). In its second part (Sections 5-7) Bolzano's positive account of grounding (...) is reconstructed in axiomatic form and critically discussed. (shrink)

This study focuses on the altars of the major annual Hopi ceremonials which display ritual objects, the possession and use of which give religious and secular power. With the importance of such objects in mind, an iconographic study of Hopi religion is particularly illuminating. This study aims to demonstrate how to view Hopi altars and is supplemented by a theory of the mechanics of efficacy in the Hopi altar context. The text provides a general introduction to Hopi religious practice and (...) distinguishes three levels of information: 1) the calendrical and ritual contexts of Hopi altars, 2) the functions of these altars within those contexts, and 3) the iconography and iconology of the altars, understood here in a literal sense as the study of the forms and structures of the altars on the one hand and the study of the implicit and explicit symbology of the altars on the other. The book provides keys to understanding through exemplification and typology, and is meant to be of particular use to museums and research libraries. (shrink)

In a number of very influential publications, Epstein and Hoover (among other authors) have recently argued that a thoroughly micro-foundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. However, as we show in this article, this metaphysical/social ontological approach to the debate fails to resolve the status of micro-foundations in the practice of economic modelling. To overcome this, we argue that endogenizing a model—that is, providing micro-foundations for it—correlates with making that model more complex. Specifically, we show that models with (...) more micro-foundations tend to have more parameters or variables. This matters, as there are well-established methodological reasons for preferring models with fewer parameters or variables—ceteris paribus. We therefore conclude that, from a practice-based point of view, micro-foundations are only defensible to the extent that they significantly improve the ability of the relevant model to fit the data of interest. In this way, we arrive at a practice-based, methodological reconceptualization of the debate surrounding the need for micro-foundations in economics. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Dynamic stability of the knee and weakness of the extensor muscles are considered to be the most important functional limitations after anterior cruciate ligament injury, probably due to changes at the central level of motor control rather than at the peripheral level. Despite general technological advances, fewer contraindicative surgical procedures, and extensive postoperative rehabilitation, up to 65% of patients fail to return to their preinjury level of sports, and only half were able to return to competitive sport. Later, it becomes (...) clear that current rehabilitation after knee surgery is not sufficient to address the functional limitations after ACL reconstruction even years after surgery. Therefore, new therapeutic tools targeting the central neural system, i.e., the higher centers of motor control, should be investigated and integrated into current rehabilitation practice. To improve motor performance when overt movement cannot be fully performed, several techniques have been developed to increase physical and mental activation without the need to perform overt movements. Among the most popular cognitive techniques used to increase physical performance are motor imagery and action observation practices. This review, which examines the available evidence, presents the underlying mechanisms of the efficacy of cognitive interventions and provides guidelines for their use at home. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universiteat Mainz, 1992, under the title: Die Kohearenztheorie der Wahrheit und der Kunst im Speatwerk von Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Introduction The analytical way of thinking has been one of the most fruitful paradigms in this century in philosophy and in different sciences, ...

The 18 contributions to this volume deal with a variety of 'tropes', such as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, euphemism, antonomasia and hyperbole. Using various approaches or paradigms the authors aim to find answers to the crucial epistemological questions, namely whether and to what extent utterances containing tropes can be said to be true or false.

Recent research has detailed the use of neuroscience in several jurisdictions, but Australia remains a notable omission. To fill this substantial void we performed a systematic review of neuroscience in Australian criminal cases. The first section of this article reports the results of our review by detailing the purposes for which neuroscience is admitted into Australian criminal courts. We found that neuroscience is being admitted pre-trial, at trial, and during sentencing. In the second section, we evaluate these applications. We generally (...) found that courts admit neuroscience cautiously, and to supplement more well-established forms of evidence. Still, we found some instances in which the court seemed to misunderstand the neuroscience. These cases ranged from interpreting neuroscience as “objective” evidence to admitting neuroscience when the same non-neuroscientific psychiatric evidence would be inadmissible for being common sense. Furthermore, in some cases, neuroscientific evidence presents a double-edged sword; it may serve to either aggravate or mitigate a sentence. Thus, the decision about whether or not to tender this evidence is risky. (shrink)

Notions of democracy and nationhood constitute the pivotal legacy of the American Revolution, but to understand their development one must move beyond a purely American context. Citizens of a Common Intellectual Homeland explores the simultaneous emergence of modern concepts of democracy and the nation on both sides of the Atlantic during the age of revolutions. Armin Mattes argues that in their origin the two concepts were indistinguishable because they arose from a common revolutionary impulse directed against the prevailing hierarchical (...) political and social order. The author shows how the reconceptualization of democracy and the nation, which resulted from this revolutionary impulse, received its decisive form from the French Revolution. Although the French Revolution was instrumental in redefining the two terms, however, neither were these changes confined to France, nor did the new meanings merely radiate from France to other countries. To illustrate the transatlantic emergence of these ideas, Mattes considers the works of pairs of prominent intellectual contemporaries--one in America and the other in Europe--each writing on a common topic. The thinkers and topics include Thomas Paine and Edmund Burke on the transatlantic revolutions, John Adams and Friedrich von Gentz on the mixed constitution, James Madison and Immanuel Kant on perpetual peace, and Thomas Jefferson and Destutt de Tracy on the nation. Mattes's approach highlights the significant impact that the French Revolution had on the evolution of thought in the period, demonstrating that the emergence and early development of modern concepts of democracy and the nation in America were intimately tied to revolutionary events and processes in the larger Atlantic world. Preparation of this volume has been supported by the Thomas Jefferson Foundation. Jeffersonian America. (shrink)

Certain strands of contemporary media theory are concerned with the ways in which computational environments exploit the ‘missing half-second’ of human perception and thereby influence, control or exploit humans at an affective level. The ‘technological unconscious’ of our times is often understood to work at this affective level, and high-frequency trading is regularly provided as a primary illustrative example of the contagious dynamics it produces. We challenge and complicate this account of the relation between consciousness, affect and media technologies by (...) drawing on the recent work of N. Katherine Hayles and by focusing in detail on the ways in which the ‘costs of consciousness’ are accounted for and negotiated in high-frequency trading. We suggest that traders actively develop modes of awareness accounting for the costs of consciousness, and that the necessary ‘stupidity’ of high-frequency trading algorithms as well as competition pose limits to the full automation of financial markets. (shrink)

Wittgensteins Philosophie ist nicht auf die „Überwindung der Metaphysik" hin angelegt, sondem auf diejenige ihrer Überwindung. Insofem ist der Schritt zurück zu Wittgenstein zugleich ein Schritt hinaus über die analytische Philosophie. Beherrschendes Ziel des frühen wie des späten Wittgenstein ist es, den Innenraum des sinnvoll Sagbaren auszumessen und dadurch einen Blick auf das Unsagbare zu erhaschen, d. h. die Grenze des Sinnsi durch minutiöse Beschreibung der physischen Welt der Tatsachen bzw. der sozialen Welt der „Sprachspiele" zu bestimmen. Das eigentlich Wertvolle (...) ist für ihn aber das, was sich nicht „sagen", sondem nur - gleichsam gegen die Regeln der Sprache - in „unsinnigen" Sätzen „zeigen" läßt: Ethik/Ästhetik, Logik/Semantik, Kunst und Religion. Scheinbar paradoxerweise wird der „Unsinn" für Wittgenstein dadurch zum eigentlichen Sinn2. Seine Philosophie zeigt sich als das, was sie immer wieder thematisiert: „Anrennen an die Grenze der Sprache", die in der Verstehbariceit von Metaphern liegt. (shrink)

Wittgensteins Philosophie ist nicht auf die „Überwindung der Metaphysik" hin angelegt, sondem auf diejenige ihrer Überwindung. Insofem ist der Schritt zurück zu Wittgenstein zugleich ein Schritt hinaus über die analytische Philosophie. Beherrschendes Ziel des frühen wie des späten Wittgenstein ist es, den Innenraum des sinnvoll Sagbaren auszumessen und dadurch einen Blick auf das Unsagbare zu erhaschen, d. h. die Grenze des Sinnsi durch minutiöse Beschreibung der physischen Welt der Tatsachen bzw. der sozialen Welt der „Sprachspiele" zu bestimmen. Das eigentlich Wertvolle (...) ist für ihn aber das, was sich nicht „sagen", sondem nur - gleichsam gegen die Regeln der Sprache - in „unsinnigen" Sätzen „zeigen" läßt: Ethik/Ästhetik, Logik/Semantik, Kunst und Religion. Scheinbar paradoxerweise wird der „Unsinn" für Wittgenstein dadurch zum eigentlichen Sinn2. Seine Philosophie zeigt sich als das, was sie immer wieder thematisiert: „Anrennen an die Grenze der Sprache", die in der Verstehbariceit von Metaphern liegt. (shrink)

Business schools have become implicated in the widespread demonisation of the financial classes. By educating those held most responsible for the crisis – financial traders and speculators – they are said to have produced ruthlessly talented graduates who have ambition in abundance but little sense for social responsibility or ethics. This ethical lack thrives upon the trading floor within a compelling critique of the complicity of the pedagogy of the business school with the financial crisis of the global economy. An (...) ethical turn within the curriculum is now widely encouraged as a counteractive force. Within this paper, however, we argue that taking this ethical turn is not enough. For business ethicists to learn from the financial crisis, the crisis' legacy needs to be taken account of, and financialisation needs to be taken seriously. Pedagogical reform cannot bracket itself off from the crisis as if it were coincidental with or separate from it. Post-crisis pedagogy must rather take the fact that it is requested now, in light of the crisis, as its very point of departure. The financial crisis must not be understood as something to be resisted in the name of Business Ethics. Instead, the financial crisis must be understood as the very foundation for contemporary Business Ethics in particular and for contemporary business and management education more generally. (shrink)

Business schools have become implicated in the widespread demonisation of the financial classes. By educating those held most responsible for the crisis – financial traders and speculators – they are said to have produced ruthlessly talented graduates who have ambition in abundance but little sense for social responsibility or ethics. This ethical lack thrives upon the trading floor within a compelling critique of the complicity of the pedagogy of the business school with the financial crisis of the global economy. An (...) ethical turn within the curriculum is now widely encouraged as a counteractive force. Within this paper, however, we argue that taking this ethical turn is not enough. For business ethicists to learn from the financial crisis, the crisis' legacy needs to be taken account of, and financialisation needs to be taken seriously. Pedagogical reform cannot bracket itself off from the crisis as if it were coincidental with or separate from it. Post‐crisis pedagogy must rather take the fact that it is requested now, in light of the crisis, as its very point of departure. The financial crisis must not be understood as something to be resisted in the name of Business Ethics. Instead, the financial crisis must be understood as the very foundation for contemporary Business Ethics in particular and for contemporary business and management education more generally. (shrink)

El trabajo de Wittgenstein es el documento de una lucha filosófica de toda la vida por comprensiones en el límite de lo pensable y su expresión adecuada, basada en la idea de limitar el alcance de lo racionalmente expresable desde adentro para ganar intuiciones más allá. Como consecuencia de su forma de pensar de doble cara, a menudo se puede sentir una tensión entre pensamientos o formas de argumentación aparentemente opuestas que a veces conducen a malas interpretaciones. En este artículo (...) se mostrará que la idea de «correr contra los límites del lenguaje» (y tratar de echar un vistazo al otro lado) fue absolutamente central para la filosofía temprana y posterior de Wittgenstein, sin embargo, todavía dejando la puerta entreabierta para explicaciones metafísicas. A partir de la concepción de un Wittgenstein de doble cara, al mismo tiempo positivista y metafísico, se puede explicar mas convincentemente la función de su introducción del concepto de «juegos de lenguaje». Se vuelve posible también arrojar nueva luz sobre su concepción de la semántica y el así llamado «argumento del lenguaje privado». (shrink)